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PROPTER HONORIS RESPECTUM

POLITICIZING THE CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY:
THE FRENCH EXAMPLE
Vivian Grosswald Curran*
C'est une lourde tdche, pour le philosophe, d'arracherles noms a ce qui en
prostitue l'usage. Dojd Platon avait toutes les peines du monde d tenirferme
sur le mot justice contre l'usage chicanier et versatile qu'en faisaient les
sophistes.1

INTRODUCTION

The advantages of world adherence to universally acceptable
standards of law and fundamental rights seemed apparent after the
Second World War, as they had after the First.2 Their appeal seems
ever greater and their advocates ever more persuasive today. The history of law provides evidence that caution may be in order, however,
and that the human propensity to ignore what transpires under the
surface of law threatens to dull and silence the ongoing self-examination and self-criticism required in perpetuity by the law if it is to be
correlated with justice.
*

Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. I am grateful for their comments
on earlier drafts to Professors Larry Backer, Pablo de Greiff, David Fraser, Christian'
Joerges and Matthias Mahlmann. Unless otherwise noted, translations are mine.
Many thanks also to Professor Adolf Granbaum for introducing me to Ignatieff's work
on Lemkin.
1 AiAIN BAniou, L'tTHIQUE: ESSAI SUR LA CONSCIENCE DU MAL 37 (1993) ("It is a
burdensome task for a philosopher to wrest names from that which prostitutes their
usage. Plato already had all the trouble in the world to hold tight on the word justice
against the sophists' disingenuous and manipulative usage of it.")
2 See Nathaniel Berman, "But the Alternative Is Despair":European Nationalism and
the Modernist Renewal of International Law, 106 l-Lv. L. Rizv. 1792, 1794 (1993)
(describing "the interpretation ... of the 'new world order' emerging from the Paris
Peace Conference").
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This Essay presents one side, the dark side, of the history of the
crime against humanity. It discusses the undermining and subversion
of legal concepts resulting from their politicization, as they become
subject to juridical argument, legal procedure, and judicial decisionmaking. So much has been written to promote the adoption of universal legal standards and urge adherence to international tribunals
that I do not undertake an overview of the crime against humanity in
today's legal order that reflects those reasons and advantages, or that
balances one side against the other.3 Rather, I undertake to highlight
the role that politics and ideology inevitably play in law. That role is
visible when one examines some aspects of the modern legal trajectory of the crime against humanity. It suggests the need for vigilance
in safeguarding concepts and values ever subject to subversion as ideologies drift under the frozen surface of legal texts, of the immutable
language that cloaks a mutable law, enabling the mutations to occur
4
invisibly, and to escape examination.
It is misleading to discuss law as being "politicized" inasmuch as
this implies an a priori "un-politicized" concept of law. Such a concept
is both inaccurate and incoherent because, although law and politics
are not identical, they are inseparable. Their inseparability has
proven to be one of a very few reliable universals of our world. To
focus on the politicization of law therefore is to dichotomize law and
politics, which in turn means to examine only one aspect of a dynamic
that is mutually interactive. To discuss the politicization of crimes
against humanity consequently will not paint the full picture. Such a
topic nevertheless may be worth exploring because human aspirations
for law often insist on an ideal for law of neutrality, objectivity, and
5
independence from politics.
Concentrating on the role of politics and ideology in law illuminates the challenges law must overcome in terms of the generally unrealistic hopes of neutrality and objectivity that still, contrary to
human experience, persistently pervade human conceptions of law. It
is not, then, in order to contradict the inherent inseparability of law
3 For a broad perspective of both goals and contemporary legal issues concerning genocide, see Diane Marie Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide,
2002 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 93.
4 The term "ideological drift" was coined byJ.M. Balkin. SeeJ.M. Balkin, Ideological Drifi and the Struggle over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869 (1993);J.M. Balkin, The
Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 275, 309 (1989) (discussing the "ideology of democratic
pluralism").

5

See William H. Simon, Fear and Loathing of Politics in the Legal Academy, 51 J.

LEGAL EDUC. 175, 175 (2001) (discussing widespread opposition to accepting law as
political).

20)03]

POLITICIZING THE CRIME AGAINST

HUMANITY

from politics that I undertake this examination of law as politicized.
Rather, it is, on the one hand, to explain what is at work in the failure
of the crime against humanity, why it has not been implemented in
accordance with its apparent substantive terms; and, on the other
hand, to warn of the broader implications for the future that this
signals.
The contemporary world is ever more ready to endorse and
adopt what it describes as international legal standards, as though
these were legal standards endowed with oneness in their intent and
in their future applications, as though they will mean tomorrow what
they mean today, and as though they will be impervious to subversion
from within. On a smaller scale, the European Union engages in the
6
same mentality, the consequences of which only the future will tell.
The crime against humanity in modern legal history is entrenched in the legacy of Nazism. 7 It arose as a reaction against Nazi
crimes, from a determination to wrest law from political ideology and
to invest it with neutrality, as well as to give a name and assign a punishment to particular brands of horror that Nazism perpetrated. No
law can escape from the clutches of societal context, however, no matter how much the history of law testifies to human craving for law to8
be immune from the dual taints of the subjective and the contingent.
A study of some aspects of the crime against humanity as it has
wended its way from the 1940s to the present offers an opportunity to
observe mechanisms intrinsic to and pervasive in law. Analyzing
6 This is not the first time that the world has seemed utterly oblivious to the
pitfalls of its legal vision for the future, as Nathaniel Berman has compellingly shown.
The similarities between his description of the interwar years and the contemporary
international community, and, taken by itself, the European Union, are striking and
blatant. See Berman, supra note 2; Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law,
Enlightened Civil Law: Legal Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 111-12 (2001).
7 See RENE CASSIN, LA PENStE ET L'ACTION 225-26 (1972) (discussing "the horrible crimes against humanity Hitler committed in addition to his so-called war crimes
that elicited in the world so powerful a reaction").
8 As I have stated elsewhere, about the best theory designed to deal with law as it
is, without abandoning the goal of law's capacity to correlate positively with justice,
seems to me to be found in the life work of Hermann Kantorowicz, founder of the
Free Law School, and often much misinterpreted after the Second World War.
Kantorowicz does not offer a blueprint for success; he weaves into the amalgam of
uncontrollable forces an injection of principles that offer at least a hope of finding
some tolerable balance, an antidote to the consequences of what I call here
"politicization." See, e.g., GNAEUS FLAvius, DER KAMPF UM DIE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT
(Heidelberg 1906); see also Vivian Grosswald Curran, Rethinking Hermann Kantorowicz:
Free Law, American Legal Realism and the Legacy of Anti-Formalism, in RETHINKING THE
MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAw 66 (Annelise Riles ed., 2001).
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crimes against humanity illuminates some of law's attributes in large
part because such crimes catch law at an extreme point of rupture, as
did Nazism, such that studying the trajectory of these crimes makes it
possible to observe phenomena of law and society that, in less turbulent times, tend to be less amenable to detection. As Theodor Adorno
put it, "He who wishes to know the truth about life must scrutinize its
estranged form."9
This Essay does not offer a comprehensive study of the crime
against humanity. It discusses the origins of the crime after the Second World War and explores its trajectory under French law through
the national courts of France in order to signal how politicization has
altered the French national concept of the crime against humanity,
until today it has become so circumscribed as to have lost much of its
bite and original purpose. It also illustrates the altering effect of law's
internal, unreflective logic, as procedural matters wield considerable
influence on the substantive development of legal concepts.
This Essay does not urge a renunciation of international tribunals
or a rejection of international legal standards. It seeks to signal the
politicization that undermines and can destroy the possibility of neutrality in international (and other) legal concepts, and that informs
the judgments of international (and other) tribunals. Even though
law by its nature is a political phenomenon, among other things, such
that it defies aspirations of objectivity and neutrality, a mitigated neutrality may be salvageable, but only if we recognize its contingent aspects or, in other words, only if we conceive of neutrality as (1) fragile
and transitory; and (2) definable only in terms of alterable and altering societal conditions.' 0
The modern world is likely to suffer from politicization increasingly, not decreasingly, because the technologies producing globalization are augmenting the scope and intensity of dominant discourses,

9

THEODOR ADORNO, MINIMA MORALIA:

REFLECTIONS FROM DAMAGED LIFE 15

(E.F.N. Jephcott trans., 1974).

10 See Arnold Brecht, The Myth of Is and Ought, 54 HARV. L. REv. 811, 825 n.43
(1941) (capturing Hermann Kantorowicz's vision of legal neutrality, by summarizing
it as "neutral relativism"); see also LUDWIG WIrTGENSTEIN, LE CAHIER BLEU ET LE CAHIER BRUN 90 (1965),

translated in CUUI'IVATING DIFFERENCES: SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES
THE MAKING OF INEQUALITY 4 (Michhle Lamont & Marcel Fournier eds., 1992)
("In the domain of thought, certain important advances are comparable to the displacement of volumes from one bookstack to the next: displacements are accomplished even if nothing allows us to think that the new position will be the one that
will remain.").
AND
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eliminating competing ones as the world transmutes into new
onenesses.I1
Dominant discourses of world-wide proportions disguise their
own assumptions, and lead to decisions of seemingly unassailable
logic based on undisclosed, maybe unconscious, but contestable
premises. Decisions will have less to do with concepts that motivated
texts of the law they purport to embody than with contemporaneous
ideologies that may subvert the very concepts they claim to promote.
The course of law always has been a function of contemporaneous contexts and perspectives, nor does the original intent of a legal
text in and of itself justify its continued application despite societal
changes over time. The problem of law's transmutations over time is
not that it transmutes, but, rather, that the fixed nature of textual
provisions hampers detection of substantive transmutations wrought by
judicial interpretation and application. Heightened awareness of the
process is desirable so that distortions can be understood on an ongoing basis, because they cannot be evaluated if they are not perceived.
Only a continuous, critical analysis has a chance of mitigating the
subversion of values that the contemporary society still endorses. This
undertaking is not the assessment of the current validity of a law's
original intent. It is the measurement of whether the law in fact
reflects the values it purports to promote, or whether legal rhetoric
has entered the service of subverting those values imperceptibly. The
dangers of undetected subversions are heightened greatly by univocal12
ity of discourse.
I.

THE MODERN IMPETUS FOR A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY

The modern impetus for the crime against humanity arose not
just from Nazi acts, but also from the extreme convergence of law with
13
political ideology in Nazi Germany and Nazi-occupied states.
11 As one scholar already put it more than forty years ago, "The various human
communities are no longer merely in contact[, t]hey are in a state of mutual penetration." Andr6 Tunc, Comparative Law, Peace and Justice, in TWENTIETH

Curran, supra note 6.
13 See BERND ROTHERS,
TRECHTSORDNUNG

IM

YNTEMA

DIE UNBEGRENZTE AUSLEGUNG: ZUM WANDEL DER PRIVA-

NATIONALSOZIALISMUS

BEGRENZTE AUSLEGUNG];

E.

CENTURY COM-

80, 83
(Kurt H. Nadelmann et al. eds., 1961).
12 I have argued elsewhere for the continued need of multivocality in law, but
believe that unification probably is inexorable, so I do not address that issue here. See
PARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW: LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HESSEL

BERND ROrTHERS,

KRONJURISTEN IM DRrTTEN REICH (1989)

(1968)

ENTARTETES

[hereinafter
RECHT:

ROTHERS,

UN-

RECHTSLEHREN

UND

[hereinafter ROTHERS, ENTARTETES RECHT],

Vivian Grosswald Curran, Fear of Formalism: Indicationsfrom the Fascist Period in France

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 78:3

Equally extreme was the peculiar degree of legalism of Nazism, the
degree to which Hitler Germany's self-description, self-representation,
and to a significant extent self-understanding, was as a nation under
law, governed by law. 14 By also placing jurisprudential concepts
within Nazi law that were antithetical to traditional notions of law,
however, the Nazi regime simultaneously rendered Nazi Germany and
Nazi-occupied countries lawless, at least in one sense.
The propriety of describing that society as lawless has been a matter of hot dispute since the war.'15 However one comes out on this
dispute, and both sides make irrefutable points within it,16 at the least
one' may conclude that Nazi Germany and occupied countries such as
France maintained a mimicry of law, such that fascist terror was visited
upon people in the name of law, pursuant to apparently legal mechanisms, channels and structures, and not in an overt shunning or repudiation of law.

17

and Germany of JudicialMethodology's Impact on Substantive Law, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
101 (2002).
14 For an excellent portrayal of this complex issue, see Michael Stolleis, Reluctance
To Glance in the Mirror: The ChangingFace of GermanJurisprudenceAfter 1933 and Post1945, in THE

DARKER LEGACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: PERCEPTIONS OF EUROPE AND PERSPEC-

TIVES ON A EUROPEAN ORDER IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP DURING THE ERA OF FASCISM AND

NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND ITS REMNANTS (Christian Joerges & Navraj Singh Ghaleigh
eds., forthcoming 2003).
15 See, for example, the debate between Professors Hart and Fuller. H.L.A. Hart,
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958); Lon L.
Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HLv.L. REV. 630
(1958); see also H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 73 (1983)
(dealing also with Gustav Radbruch's natural law positions). For a summary of the
legal literature in Germany, see Markus Dirk Dubber, Judicial Positivism and Hitler's
Injustice, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1807 (1993).
16 For my discussion of this debate, see Curran, supra note 13, at 134-41. See also
David Fraser, "The OutsiderDoes Not See All the Game... ":Perceptions of German Law in
the Anglo-American World, 1933-1940, in THE DARKER LEGACY OF EUROPEAN LAw: PERCEPTIONS OF EUROPE AND PERSPECTIVES ON A EUROPEAN ORDER IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
DURING THE ERA OF FASCISM AND NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND ITS REMNANTS (Christian
Joerges & Navraj Singh Ghaleigh eds., forthcoming 2003).
17 One might dispute this statement to the extent that Nazi Germany and occupied countries also had institutions that bypassed strictly legal ones. On the whole,
however, scrupulous maintenance of the structures of law and use of the channels of
law and legal institutions characterized Nazi Germany and Vichy France.
See ROTHERS, UNBEGRENZTE AUSLEGUNG, supra note 13; ROTHERS, ENTARTETES RECHT,
supra note 13. Michael Stolleis also captures what I mean above when he writes of the
Nazi system as a "legal form in which injustice was clothed." Stolleis, supra note 14
(emphasis added) (pagination not yet available); see also RENE CASSIN, UN COUP
D'ITAT: LA SOI-DISANT CONSTITUTION DE VICHY (1940) (arguing that French people's
adherence to Vichy law was to principles they deeply reviled, but was made possible by
the fact that an outward appearance of legality accompanied Vichy measures).
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Raphael Lemkin was among the many whose reaction to Hitlerism after 1945 was to pin their hopes on depoliticizing law, with an
underlying faith that law at its core is neutral and correlates positively
with justice. Lemkin was a lawyer and law professor, originally from
Poland, whose family was exterminated by Hitler because they were
Jews. Lemkin coined the term "genocide" and drafted what became
the U.N. Convention on Genocide, 18 always in the capacity as a private
individual, as he had no diplomatic or other governmental status. 19
According to a recent article by Michael Ignatieff, among the
many remarkable attributes of Lemkin was his understanding of Nazi
genocide from his reading of Nazi jurisprudence, not from being privy to
the critical facts of the Nazis' actual genocide.20 According to Ignatieff, at a time when others who were privy to those facts, such as Isaiah
Berlin, Nahum Goldman and Chaim Weizmann (all of whom would
have had every personal motive to believe the truth), could not bring
themselves to believe them, Lemkin divined and believed the truth
from his reading of Nazi jurisprudence in the absence of the sort of
concrete, factual information that had reached Berlin, Goldman, and
2I
Weizmann.
Already in 1933 at the League of Nations's Fifth International
Conference for the Unification of Penal Law, held in Madrid, Lemkin
had proposed a new sort of crime, what later he would call the crime
of genocide, though in 1933 he had not yet coined that term.2 2 In an
article he wrote in 1947, Lemkin described his 1933 idea.23 At that
time he had formulated two new crimes for international law, the
crimes of "barbarity" and of "vandalism," which in 1947 he explained
as follows, " [T] he present writer.., envisaged [in 1933] the creation
of two new international crimes: the crime of barbarity, consisting in
the extermination of racial, religious or social collectivities, and the
18 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, reprinted in BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP
395 (1991) [hereinafter U.N.
Convention on Genocide].
19 See WILLIAM KOREY, AN EPITAPH FOR RAPHAEL LEMKIN (Stephen Steinlight ed.,
2001) (The Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights of the
American Jewish Committee) (pre-publication copy).
20 Michael Ignatieff, The Danger of a World Without Enemies: Lemkin's Word, NEW
REPUBLIC, Feb. 26, 2001, at 25, 26.
21 See id. at 26.
22 See Raphael Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime Under InternationalLaw, 41 Am. J. INT'L
L. 145, 146 (1947) (discussing author's 1933 proposal that "the destruction of racial,
religious or social collectivities [should be declared] a crime under the law of nations
(delictum iuris gentium)").
23 See id.
R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw: SELECTED DOCUMENTS
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crime of vandalism, consisting in the destruction of cultural and artistic works of these groups." 24 He had drafted his 1933 proposed
crimes as follows:
Whosoever, out of hatred towards a racial, religious or social
collectivty [sic], or with a view to the extermination thereof, undertakes a punishable action against the life, bodily integrity, liberty,
dignity or economic existence of a person belonging to such a collectivity, is liable, for the crime of barbarity ... unless his deed falls
within a more severe provision of the given code.
Whosoever, either out of hatred towards a racial, religious or
social collectivity, or with a view to the extermination thereof, destroys its cultural or artistic works, will be liable for the crime of
vandalism .

.

. unless his deed falls within a more severe provison

[sic] of the given code.
The above crimes will be prosecuted and punished irrespective
of the place where the crime was committed and of the nationality
of the offender, according to the law of the country where the of25
fender was apprehended.
As enacted fifteen years later, Article I of the U.N. Convention on
Genocide makes the crime against humanity, "whether committed in
time of peace or in time of war[,] a crime under international law
which [the Contracting Parties] undertake to prevent and to punish."2 6 Pursuant to Article II,
genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group;
27
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Lemkin was utterly unsuccessful in his first attempt in 1933. As
William Korey describes it in his recent monograph, Lemkin was
treated with derision and contempt in Madrid, especially because, by
24
25

Id.
Id. at 146 n.3.

26 U.N. Convention on Genocide, supra note 18, art. I, reprinted in BAMv E.
CARTER

& PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE,

INTERNAIONAL LAW: SELEC.TED DOCUMENTS

27 Id., reprinted in BARRY E.
SELECTED DOCUMENTS

395 (1991).

CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW:

395-96 (1991).
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the time of the meeting in October 1933, Germany's delegates were
28
already Nazis.
Lemkin escaped from Europe and became a law professor at a
number of eminent U.S. law schools, including Duke and Columbia,
but he left each of his university posts to devote his energy to the allconsuming task of drafting what was to become the U.N. Convention
on Genocide, then to promoting its adoption, and, finally, to tireless
efforts (unavailing during his lifetime) towards United States ratification of the Convention. 29 Lemkin lived to see the U.N. adopt his convention, with the title of "genocide" that he had given to the newly
defined crime.3 0 He had sacrificed his personal and professional life
to this end, and he died alone, completely impoverished, and semi31
starved.
II.

THE FRENCH LEGACY OF THE NEW CRIME

The hope Lemkin and many others cherished in 1945-namely,
that formulating the crime against genocide would prevent future
genocides-never was realized. Nevertheless, faith in the positive potential of international law and criminal tribunals appears unabated to
date. Many urge universal submission to international tribunals that
possess the power to adjudicate crimes against humanity. 3 2 The his-

tory of the crime against humanity suggests that hope in the universalization of law is misplaced. It signifies perhaps, as Hans Morgenthau
28

See KoREv, supra note 19, at 9-13.

29
30

See id.
See id.

31 See id. For background information on the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and a moving tribute to its drafters in an article offering far more optimism in
the future than this Essay, see Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the UniversalDeclarationof
Human Rights, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1153, 1153-82 (1998). See also MARY ANN
GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARA-

OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001) (offering background on Eleanor Roosevelt's involvement in the drafting of the Declaration and an optimistic analysis of the Declaration's
function and purpose).
32 Ren6 Cassin, drafter of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, was one
such person who understood that the Genocide Convention had failed to prevent
genocide, but whose faith in international tribunals remained intact. He wrote that
"the Convention against genocide is sterile. Genocides occur, alas!," but attributed
this to the fact that "sanctions [for violating the Genocide Convention] are in the
hands of judges of those countries that are totalitarian dictatorships or in a state of
anarchy, rather than, as should be the case, in the hands of an international criminal
court." CASSIN, supra note 7, at 160. For a thorough history of the origins of and
connections between crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes, in recent
western legal history, see Georges Levasseur, Les crimes contre l'humaniteet le problme de
leurprescription,93 J. DROIT INT'L 259 (1966).
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put it, "an inveterate tendency to stick to... assumptions and to suffer
constant defeat from experience rather than to change . . . assump-

tions in the light of contradictory facts," 33 an attitude he also summarized as follows, "As the League of Nations was a failure, let us have
another League." 34 The problem may be that "history is the best
35
schoolmaster with the most inattentive pupils."
The first hope history dashed was that formulating the new crime
of genocide and the crime against humanity would prevent those
crimes from being committed in the future. But even beyond that, if
one takes as a study sample the crime against humanity's treatment
under French law, one sees a legal system prepared to reorient legal
concepts so as to prevent unpleasant political issues and consequences
deemed politically undesirable. Each nation's legal developments follow a course that has much to do with national phenomena of a legal,
social, historical and cultural nature, so no example can pretend to
universal applicability or generalization. The many twists arid turns of
events in France highlight, however, the politicization to which the
crime against humanity is amenable and is likely to remain amenable.
In 1964, France's crime against humanity became "imprescriptible,"
or not subject to a statute of limitations.3 6 The idea of imprescriptibility for crimes against humanity was implied in the Nuremberg Tribunal. 37 According to the Dalloz edition of the French Criminal Code,

the "[f] oundation of imprescriptibility 38 for crimes against humanity
lies in their nature; "their imprescriptibility is inferred as much from
33
INT'L

Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and InternationalLaw, 34 AM. J.
L. 260, 260 (1940).

34 Id.
35 Translated from "Die Geschichte ist der beste Lehrmeister mit den unaufmerksamsten
Schfilern," which was the "Quote of the Day" ("Spruch des Tages") of September 13,
2002, at the web site of the News Service for Historians (Nachrichtendienstfur Historiker) at http://www.nthdata.de (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
36 Law No. 64-1326, J.O., Dec. 26, 1964, p. 11,788 ("Crimes against humanity, as

defined by the resolution of the United Nations of 13 February 1946, taking legal
cognizance of the definition of crimes against humanity, as it figures in the charter of
the international tribunal of 8 August 1945, are imprescriptible by their nature."); see
also Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Legalization of Racism in a ConstitutionalState: Democ-

racy's Suicide in Vichy France, 50 HASTINGs LJ. 1, 74 n.254 (1998).
37 C. P9N. 1996-1997, at 153 (Dalloz 1996) [hereinafter C. PEN.

DALLOZ], citing
Cass crim.,Jan. 26, 1984, Bull. Crim., No. 34, J.C.P. 1984, II, 20197, note Ruzi6, rapp.

Le Gunehec & concl. Dontenwille; see also Cass. crim., Oct. 6, 1983, Bull. Crim., No.
239, Gaz. Pal. 1983, 2, pan. jurispr., 710, rapp. Le Gunehec, concl. Dontenwille
(L'arroft Barbie). Both arritsare discussed in Cass. crim., Dec. 20, 1991, Gaz. Pal. 1993,
1, pan. jurispr., 281, 286, rapp. Guerder (Georges Boudarel) [hereinafter Boudarel].

38 C.

PgN. DALLOZ,

supra note 37, at 153.
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general principles of law39 recognized by the assembly of nations as
from the statute of the International Military Tribunal appended to
the London Charter of 8 August 1945; the [French national] law of
December 26, 1964, limited itself to confirming that this imprescriptibility already was acquired, in internal law, by the effect of the interna40
tional texts to which France had adhered."
When a new French criminal code went into effect in 1994, it
maintained the imprescriptible nature of the crime against
41
humanity.
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg,42 to which the French crime against humanity was tied, defines
"crimes against humanity" in Article 6 as
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law
of the country where perpetrated.
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating
in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to
commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts per43
formed by any persons in execution of such plan.
The French crime against humanity mirrors this definition,
adopting many of its terms:
The deportation, enslavement ["r~duction en esclavagd'] or the mas-

sive and systematic practice of summary executions, kidnappings of
persons followed by their disappearance, of torture or inhuman
acts, for reasons of ["inspirespar des motifs [de]] politics, philoso-

phy, race or religion and organized in execution of a concerted
plan against a civilian population group .... 44
The French crime against humanity also is based on the U.N. Conven45
tion on Genocide.
39 For a discussion of general principles ("principes g6nraux') under French law,
see Curran, supra note 13, at 141-51.
40 C. PtN. DALLOZ, supra note 37, at 153.
41 Id.
42 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the
European Axis of August 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
43 Id. art. 6, reprinted in BARRY E. CARTER & PI-1LLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL
LAw 1163-64 (3d ed. 1999).
44 C. P9N. DALLOZ, supra note 37, at 150.
45 See Jacques Francillon, Livre deuxime: Des crimes et d~lits contre les personnes, in
GABRIEL RoUJOU DE BOUBtE ET AL., CODE PNAL COMMENTP 107 (1996).
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Events after the Second World War created numerous thorny issues for France's post-war administrations and judicial system in cases
alleging crimes against humanity. The first trial after imprescriptibility was that of the German Nazi, Klaus Barbie, who was just the sort of
defendant for whom France's crime against humanity had been prolonged to reach, despite the passage of many decades between his
crimes and his trial. The Barbie trial gave rise to an unexpected possibility that his defense attorney explicitly threatened: namely, if Barbie
were convicted of crimes he had committed as part of the Nazi occupation on French soil, against French people, the analogy between his
conduct and France's conduct in Algeria would result in French defendants being deemed to have committed crimes against humanity in
46
Algeria in the name of France.
The French judicial response was to nullify this threat by redefining and delimiting the crime against humanity so as to avoid this previously unforeseen possibility. The Cour de cassation4 7 thus stated that
the crime against humanity would be limited to crimes committed "in
the name of a State practicing a policy of ideological hegemony." 48 France
would not be subject to inclusion in that definition because its scope
49
was deemed limited to fascist-totalitarian states.
No sooner had the French judiciary seemingly solved this problem than another, equally unpleasant, prospect arose out of the crime
against humanity. This time the defendant was Paul Touvier, a
Frenchman who had worked for the milice during the Vichy period.
The milice was a paramilitary organization created by the Vichy government, which garnered the reputation of Gestapo-like cruelty for its
46 See Curran, supra note 36, at 77-78 ("Barbie's lawyer... the renowned Jacques
Verges, whose clients have included numerous Middle Eastern terrorists, raised the

unpleasant specter of France's crimes in Algeria in the 1950s, suggesting that a guilty
verdict for Barbie necessarily would augur by analogy the same result for those responsible for crimes of torture and murder committed in France's name during the
Algerian war of 1954-1962.").
47 This court is the highest court in France for matters classified as private law.
For the complicated status of criminal law in the private/public law distinction, see
DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITs STRUCTURE, SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 116-22
(Michael Kindred trans., 1972).
48 Cass. crim., Dec. 20, 1985, 1986J.C.P. I G, No. 20,655, Barbie (emphasis added); see also Cass. crim., Jan. 23, 1997, J.C.P. 1997, II1, No. 14, 22812, Papon [arrt
No. 502] (stating that Papon's acts were for an "Axis country practicing a policy of
ideological hegemony" ("pays de l'Axe pratiquantune politique d'heg6monie ideologique"));
Guyora Binder, RepresentingNazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial of Klaus Barbie, 98
YALE L.J. 1321, 1329 (1989); Leila Sadat Wexler, Reflections on the Trial of Vichy Collaborator Paul Touvier for Crimes Against Humanity in France, 20 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 191,
REN9

202 (1995).
49

See Curran, supra note 36, at 78.
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torture and its murders. 50 The new challenge concerned how the judicial decision might implicate France for its collaborative acts during
51
the Vichy years.
The lower court dismissed the charges against Touvier pursuant
the
limitation on crimes against humanity that the Cour de cassation
to
had crafted in Barbie: namely, the judicial requirement that the crimes
be committed by a state practicing "ideological hegemony." 52 The
lower court in Touvier's case ruled that Vichy France did not meet
that criterion, so it dismissed the charges against Touvier because
Touvier had worked for Vichy France, rather than for Nazi
53
Germany.
Thus, the original limiting language of the Barbie decision, designed to immunize France from being judged for crimes against humanity based on its conduct in Algeria, was extended in the Touvier
case to avoid ajudicial confrontation with the nation's past during the
Vichy years. Paradoxically, this ruling represented a sea change in
post-war France's tenaciously promulgated mythology about Vichy.
The Touvier decision signified a concession, never made before in official circles, that Vichy was not a German phenomenon, since crimes
committed by Nazi Germany were within the purview of the crime
against humanity, and Nazi Germany came within the scope of a state
"practicing a policy of ideological hegemony." 5 4 This implicit aspect
of the court opinion contradicted the official claim, initiated by
Charles de Gaulle and perpetuated since the time of France's liberation, that Vichy never had been France, that it always was a German
phenomenon, a puppet state set up by Germany and carried out with
the complicity of only a few French henchmen, to the disagreement
55
and resistance of essentially the entire occupied nation.
50 See, e.g., id.
51 The lower court decisions were unpublished; the initial Touvier indictment
was on June 2, 1993, by the Cour d'appel of Versailles. The Cour de cassationdenied his
appeal of the indictment, Cass. crim., Oct. 21, 1993, and his trial conviction by the
Cour d'assises of Yvelines occurred on April 20, 1994. See Wexler, supra note 48, at 192
n.3.
52 See Curran, supra note 36, at 78.
53 See id.; see also Leila Sadat Wexler, The Interpretationof the Nuremberg Principles by
the French Court of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 289, 344-51 (1994) (discussing the April 1992 Touvier decision of the
Cour d'appeO.
54 Cass. crim.,Jan. 23, 1997,J.C.P. 1997, III, No. 14, 22812, Papon [arrit no. 502].
55 See, e.g., CHARLES DE GAULLE, MCMOIRES DE GUERRE: L'UNIT 1942-1944 (1956);
Dominique Rousseau, Vichy a-t-il existg, in 28 LE GENRE HUMAIN: JUGER SOUS VICHY 97,
103 (Maurice Olender ed., 1994).
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In the end, public outcry led to a reversal of the lower court decision in Touvier.5 6 While this reversal seems to have been deemed politically necessary to calm an indignant public, 57 the French judiciary
still managed (as it has done to date) to avoid the issue of Vichy. It
did this by introducing yet another limitation on the French crime
against humanity, holding that the act must have been committed by a
European Axis power, or by a perpetrator acting in complicity with an
Axis power. 58 Henceforth, no inquiry as to whether Vichy had been
an autonomous perpetrator of crimes against humanity could be legally cognizable, and France's judiciary would be spared the challenge
of examining and defining historical meaning and the role of France
59
in the Holocaust.
Touvier's conviction theoretically depended on the jury's finding
that he had acted on behalf of Germany (or possibly Italy, a still less
likely outcome), because the court required the act to have been done
by or for a European Axis power. Because so much remains implicit
and unarticulated in French court decisions, we are left to infer that
since Touvier was found guilty, he somehow must have worked for
Germany, rather than for France, even though his employer, the
milice, was an official organization created by Vichy, with a French
charter of its own, promulgated by Vichy.60 The Cour de cassation did
not address explicitly whether the lower court had erred in ruling that
Vichy by its nature was autonomous, and therefore could not have
committed crimes against humanity. The French Criminal Code pub56 See Wexler, supra note 53, at 349 (describing the decision not to prosecute
Touvier as "provok[ing] an uproar").
57 The public's role was part of the complicated relation between the French executive and judiciary. The parquet (which is analogous to the prosecution in the

United States) traditionally submitted to politically motivated orders from the executive. In the Papon case, the Minister ofJustice, Jacques Toubon, "in a state of panic at

the prospect of the public outcry likely to follow a second dismissal, asked the prosecutor to reverse its decision and to issue instead a renvoi d'assises, an order committing
the case for trial at the trial court level." Eric Conan, Le casse-tdtejuridique,L'EXPRESS,
Oct. 2, 1997, at 29. For the public's involvement in the Touviercase, see Curran, supra
note 36, at 79.
58 Cass. crim., Nov. 27, 1992, J.C.P. 1993, II, 21977, Michel Dobkine.
59 Touvier ultimately was convicted, but this conviction implicitly signified that he
must have been carrying out German instructions, even though no evidence of that
was introduced. See Curran, supra note 36, at 78-79. For a more positive interpretation of the French judicial redefinition of the crime against humanity as an effort to
de-politicize it, see LAWRENCE DouGLAs, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LAW AND
HIsToRY IN THE TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST 195 (2001) (arguing that France's courts
were seeking to "preempt[ ] the tendentious use of the incrimination to challenge
every unpopular act by any government").
60 Curran, supra note 36, at 78-79.
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lished by Dalloz refers to the Touvier case as follows in the section of
explanatory notes following the code's Article 212-1:
The French national who, upon the instigation of a responsible party
from a criminal Nazi organization,orders the assassination of persons

chosen by him exclusively by reason of their belonging to the Jewish
community, knowingly participates, on behalf of a European Axis
power, in the concerted plan of extermination and persecution of
that community effectuated by the German National Socialist government, and renders himself a party to crimes against humanity.... Even if they were perpetrated on the occasion of, and in
reprisal for, the assassination of a member of the French Milice [as
was the case with respect to the Touvier murders], such assassinad']
tions, committed under such conditions, are part of ["s'Yin grent
61

that concerted plan and constitute a crime against humanity.
Although the Touvier trial was surrounded by a media blitz that
equated it with the trial of Vichy France, the charges against the defendant concentrated solely on his personal decision to murderJewish
hostages, impeding any connection between his acts and the Vichy
government. As one French legal scholar has put it, "by tying
Touvier's conduct to Nazi Germany and not to the French State, 6 2 the
63
Cour de cassation skirted the true debate."

The issue of Vichy's role seemed much more difficult to avoid,
however, in the subsequent collaborator trial of Maurice Papon. Second in command of the police in the Gironde, the Bordeaux area,
Papon had ordered the arrest and deportation of some 1700Jews pursuant to orders of his superiors in the Vichy French government. In
Papon's case, the defendant's acts were state acts, and could not be
64
reduced to personal acts as the Court had done in Touvier's case.
Consequently, it seemed as though the Papon court would have to address directly the issue of whether Vichy had been autonomous, or if it
had been a puppet government of Germany. The Cour de cassation
managed once again to avoid the issue, however. 65 The Court wrote
that Papon had been "fully cognizant of the Vichy government's antisemitic policies,' 66 but then characterized Papon's acts as having
61 C. PtN. DALLOZ, supra note 37, at 151 (citing Cass. crim., Oct. 21, 1993, Bull.
Crim., No. 307) (emphasis added).

62

The term used here is "l'Etatfranfais," the name by which the Vichy govern-

ment was known, in contrast to the R publiquefranvaise.

63
64

Roqjou DE BOUBfE ET AL., supra note 45, at 111.
See Curran, supra note 36, at 80.

65

Cass. crim.,Jan. 23, 1997, J.C.P. 1997, II, No. 14,22812, Papon.

66

See id.
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been performed to further Germany's plans for genocidal
extermination:
[The] illegal arrests, imprisonments and internments, carried out at
the request of the German authorities, particularly of the Kommando
der Sicherheitspolizei und der Sicherheitsdienst (SIPO-SD), lending its services to the Bordeaux branch of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt
(RSHA), the Reich security organization, [the above illegal acts]
were accomplished with the active assistance of Maurice Papon, at
the time the Secretary General of the prefecture of the Gironde, who,
by virtue of the wide delegation of power accorded him by the regional prefet [i.e., the head of the prefecture], exercised authority
equally over the [several] services of the police, as well as over the
running of the M~rignac camp and services emanating from the
war, such as that ofJewish Questions [i.e., an organization set up by
Petain to accomplish the elimination of Jews from French public
and professional life and from property ownership] ....
[Further, Papon] fully assisted the German leadership at all
stages of the operations; namely, in preparing the arrests and in the
practical organization of the convoys; . . . Maurice Papon himself,
fromJuly, 1942 to May, 1944, delivered orders for the arrest, internment and transfer of persons to [the] Drancy [camp]; . . . the service which he led always sought to ensure maximum efficiency in
the anti-Jewish measures that were in his jurisdiction-such as the
updating of files on Jews, or regular communication with the [German] SIPO-SD to provide information about Jews-and sometimes
even without waiting for instructions from the central authorities of
the Vichy Government, where he requested the same [from Vichy]
67
or from the occupier.
The Cour de cassation then further redefined the crime against humanity by holding that, contrary to the Statute of the International
Military Tribunal, under French law, French courts can convict a defendant of crimes against humanity even if the defendant personally
and individually had not adhered to the "policy of ideological hegemony." The court remained silent as to whether Vichy possessed or
lacked an ideology of hegemony. 68

67 Id.
68 But the Conseil d'titat opinion of April 12, 2002, see infra note 78, appears for
the first time to be a judicial characterization of Vichy as possessing culpability and
responsibility for acts for which the Cour de cassation convicted Papon. (Having to

date read only the Conseil d'ttat'sopinion, without accompanying doctrine, I draw this
unconfirmed inference with hesitation, because the French doctrine (i.e., legal scholarly commentary of French judicial decisions) can be so influential as to constitute a
definitive interpretation of a case's meaning.)
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The highly political nature of the Court's rulings reflects more
than judicial aversion to confronting the issue of national history,
memory and collaboration. It also resulted from the control that
France's executive branch traditionally has exerted over the judiciary,
control that stems, in part, from the intentional relegation by the po-.
litical system of the judiciary to a position of inferiority around the
time of the French Revolution, 69 and reinforced by the power de
Gaulle was able to infuse into the executive branch in post-war French
70
government.
The turns and twists of Papon's trial were endless and too numerous to recount here. 71 They were buffeted on the one hand by the
69 See, e.g., John Henry Merryman, The French Deviation, 44 Am. J. CoMP. L. 109
(1996) (discussing the limitations placed on the judiciary in post-Revolutionary
France).
70 See La Constitution de 1958: Loi constitutionnelle du 3juin 1958, in LEs CONSTITUTIONS DE LA FRANCE DEPUIS 1789, at 424-52 (Jacques Godechot ed., Garnier Flammarion 1995) (1979).
71 I discuss in detail those that occurred before 1998 in Curran, supra note 36. In
the latest twist, on July 24, 2002, as this Essay was being written, the European Court
of Human Rights (ECHR) condemned France for "proces ingquitable," unfair trial, for
having denied Papon his right of appeal. Papon had filed appeal of his conviction to
the Cour de cassation. The court had notified him that he needed to appear on October 21, 1999. This requirement, known as the "mise en 6tat," obliged the defendant to
become a prisoner on the night before the court reviewed his or her appeal, a rule
that dated to the reign of Francis I and that has since been abolished (due to an
ECHR ruling in a French case preceding Papon's case but still in effect when Papon's
Cour de cassation hearing was due to occur.) For a discussion of mise en etat and the
criminal law reforms of 2000, see Jacqueline Hodgson, Suspects, Defendants and Victims
in the French CriminalProcess: The Context of Recent Reform, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 781,
783 (2002). Papon requested dispensation from this requirement. The Cour de cassation denied Papon's request. Instead of turning himself over to the court, however,
Papon fled to Switzerland. After Papon was captured and returned to France, the
Cour de cassation declared his appeal of conviction void due to his willful failure to
comply with the court's earlier order of mise en etat. Papon appealed to the ECHR,
and the ECHR condemned France, finding that Papon had been deprived of his fundamental right to appeal his criminal conviction, requiring the Cour de cassation now
to meet in plenary session to adjudicate Papon's renvoi (appeal). For a detailed account of the entire chronology of the Papon case to date by the ECHR, see the ECHR
decision, Hudoc reference REF00019903, Papon v. France, Nov. 15, 2001, at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/Hudoc2doc2/HFDEC/200111/54210da-chbl_15112001_f.doc
(last visited Apr. 3, 2003). Some two months later, on September 18, 2002, the Paris
Court of Appeals ( Courd'appeldeParis)freed Papon from prison for reasons of health
and age. (He is now ninety-two years old and allegedly in poor health.) See Isabelle
Tallec, La liberation de Maurice Papon, L'ExPREss EN LIGNE, Sept. 18, 2002, at http://
www.lexpress.fr/Express/Info/France/Dossier/papon/dossier.asp (last visited Apr. 3,
2003). His freedom still is not assured, as, according to the New York Times, the prosecutor declared that the state would not appeal, see Elaine Scolino, French Free Top
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executive branch's wish to delay and ultimately avoid trials that risked
involving a retrospective spectacle of France's crimes during Vichy
and, on the other hand, by the winds of public opinion, including an
erupting, irrepressible curiosity about Vichy and its national significance to French youth. Governmental delay tactics in not bringing
Papon to trial for many years had given way eventually to the public's
clamor to see Papon stand trial, but the decades-long nature of the
delays meant that almost everyone of relevance to the matter, other
than Papon himself, was dead, including Sabatier, Papon's supervisor,
who had proclaimed shortly before he died that it was he who had had
full responsibility for the crimes now being attributed to Papon. 72
One of the many consequences of lengthy delays in prosecuting
the defendants has been a reductio ad absurdumin the charges. Professor Binder estimates in the case of Klaus Barbie that the paucity of
viable evidence meant Barbie could not be tried for more than 750 of
the 12,000 victims for which he was known to be responsible. 73
Moreover, those who testified against Barbie, Touvier and Papon
tended to be aged Holocaust survivors with memories dim and testimony so confused as to diminish their credibility.7" Finally, in
Papon's case, even the civil-party plaintiffs75 indirectly acknowledged

that the defendant had committed crimes that may not have met the
Civilian OfficialJailedfor War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, at A3, only to be ordered the next day by the government (of President Chirac) to appeal, for fear of
tarnishing France's image with antisemitism. See Elaine Sciolino, French Government To
Seek Return of Nazi War Criminal to Prison,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2002, at A12. Because
this decision is separate from the ECHR proceeding, however, it would not seem to
eliminate the need for the Cour de cassation to meet on the issue of Papon's fundamental trial and appeal rights (the "procds ingquitabld' finding of the ECHR).
72 See Curran, supra note 36, at 73-94. Indeed, it is one of the more bizarre
judicial twists of this story that at one point the court decided to dismiss all charges
against Papon, not because it deemed him innocent, but solely because it had been a
mistake not to have indicted Sabatier also. See id.
73 See Binder, su/.ra note 48, at 1325, 1327-28.
74 For this pervasive problem in all of the trials that depended on imprescriptibility, see Curran, supra note 36, at 93 (discussing with respect to Papon's trial that
"[t]he permanence the witnesses achieved for their narrative, by virtue of its judicial
molding, necessarily rested on historical distortion, deformation and reductionism");
LUCIEN LAZARE, LE LIVRE DES JUSTES: HISTOIRE DU SAUVETAGE DES JUIFS PAR DES NON

1940-1944 (1993).
Under French law, individuals may be plaintiffs in criminal actions, and may
initiate them. CODE DE PROCPDURE PENALE art. 1-3 [hereinafter C. PR. P9N.]. Such
civil-party actions for crimes against humanity benefit from the same exemption from
statutes of limitation as those brought by the State. See Roujou DE BOUB9E ET AL.,
supra note 45, at 133 & n.3. The Code of Criminal Procedure also provides that anyone alleging to have been harmed by a crime may become a civil party. C. PR. PEN. art.
85.

JULES EN FRANCE,

75
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requirements of crimes against humanity. 76 Maitre Klarsfeld, the attorney for many of the civil-party plaintiffs, urged the court to consider recognizing (i.e., creating) a lower rank of crime within the
crime against humanity. He could not urge a classification of Papon's
acts as crimes falling under any rubric other than the crime against
humanity, because no claim could survive the statute of limitations if
not asserted pursuant to crimes against humanity, but he seemed to
fear the jury might acquit Papon entirely if the charge did not introduce some nuance into the traditional conception of crimes against
humanity.
The court rejected the proposal of a new, lower-ranked crime
against humanity, and convicted Papon of complicity in crimes against
humanity, the initial charge, but only sentenced him to ten years. The
sentence alone testifies to the paradoxical nature of the affair, as ten
years would seem an utterly insufficient penalty for acts so heinous as
77
to constitute complicity in crimes against humanity.

French official reactions to Vichy have undergone numerous vicissitudes, including President Jacques Chirac's reversal of position in
1995 by declaring that Vichy was French after all. Moreover, the-issues
of property expropriated or "spoliated" under confiscatory Aryanization laws, which recently were the basis of class action lawsuits initi76 See Eric Conan, ProcesPapon: Ilfaut enfinir, L'ExPREss, Jan. 22, 1998, at 10, 15;
Curran, supra note 36, at 82 & n.286.
77 After convicting Papon, the court refused to imprison him before his appeal
was heard, on the grounds that he was old and reputedly in poor health. The court
further refused the plaintiffs' request that Papon at least be deprived of his passport.
Passport intact, he fled to Switzerland, leaving behind a statement that he was obliged
to go into exile like Victor Hugo before him. The public outcry was considerable and
the media attention incessant. High French government officials, including the Minister ofJustice, personally went on national television to declare their commitment to
finding him. He was found within a few days, and returned to France and prison.
One is left to speculate that Papon may have calculated incorrectly that he still had
enough friends in high places who would see to it that he was not discovered or
extradited. The paradox of a penalty too low to fit the heinous nature of the crime
has haunted the French crime against humanity since its inception, and has been
attributed to the legislature. See Roujou DE BoUBEE ET AL., supra note 45, at 108,
131-32; see also George P. Fletcher, Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499, 1539 (2002) (urging the introduction of a collective
aspect to guilt in cases of crimes against humanity, such that the individual perpetrators of national crimes can be held criminally liable without excessively harsh punishment, and so that the collective nature of the crime can be imputed to the collectivity
as well as to the individual perpetrator). For a discussion of the European Court of
Human Rights's ultimate vindication of Papon, see supra note 71. From his trial onwards, Papon and his lawyer made it clear that if Papon were convicted, France would
be convicted in the European arena, a position with which many French legal scholars
agreed, and which proved to have been an accurate prediction.
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ated in U.S. courts, further intensified France's attention to its past.
The problem of Vichy is far from over. It is clear that Vichy will not go
away, no matter what the courts do, and French society as a whole is
becoming more receptive to self-examination. 7 Less clear is whether
the courts can offer the appropriate forum for France's coming to
terms with its own history. 79 It is perhaps preferable that the debate
take place in a wider arena.8 0
The specter of Algeria, cleverly raised by Jacques Verges, Barbie's
defense lawyer, also would not "go away." Both Vichy and Algeria are
like palimpsests, texts smothered by superimposed layers of history
and rewritten accounts, but slowly and inexorably penetrating
through all of the smothering sheets to surface after all, in a writing
that must be decoded by new generations. Perhaps not coincidentally, the two periods are linked by the person of Vichy collaborator
Maurice Papon. His career under Vichy was a prelude, not an impediment, to future professional successes and eminence. Papon eventually became a cabinet minister under Fran~ois Mitterrand.8 1 Before
then, in the 1960s, he rose to become prfet de police in Paris.8 2 During
that tenure, he ordered the torture and massacre of Algerians in
83
France.
On a legal level, despite the judicial contortions of the crime
against humanity that would have seemed to have removed France
78 On April 12, 2002, the Conseil dltat issued an opinion concerning Papon's
demand that the French government be required to pay the amount for which he had
been held liable to the civil-party plaintiffs. Dicision du Conseil d'Etat: Le Conseil d'Etat
statuant au contentieux, sur le rapport de la l re sous-section de la Section de contentieux, No.
238689, Stance du 5 avril 2002, lecture du 12 awil 2002-M. Papon, at http://
www.conseil-etat.fr/ce/jurispd/index ac-ld0205.shtml (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
The Conseil d'btat partly agreed with Papon, deciding that a portion of the responsibility for his crimes was attributable to the State. This "State" was Vichy France. The
Conseil d'Etat ordered the French government to pay the civil-party plaintiffs for that
portion, thus implicitly ruling that the French government of today is a successor
government to Vichy France. My analysis stems from the text of the court's decision
that appears on the Internet without any legal commentary as to its significance. I
therefore have not yet had the benefit of what may be critical accompanying explanatory commentary. On the differences between civil- and common-law concepts of
criminality, see Fletcher, supra note 77, at 1538-39 & n.163 (citing GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 190-94 (1998)).
79 See Curran, supra note 36, at 73-96.
80 For the view that trials are appropriate and effective instruments of historical
pedagogy, see DoucLAS, supra note 59, at 195.
81 See Curran, supra note 36, at 75.
82 See id.
83 See 2 PIERRE VIDAL-NAQUET, MtMoIREs: LE TROUBLE ET LA LUMIIRE 1955-1998,
at 150 (1998); JEAN-Luc EINAUDI, OCTOBRE 1961: UN MASSACRE A PARIS (2001).
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from the potential onus of crimes against humanity, France's conduct
in Algeria erupted into scandal last year with the publication of a book
s
by General Paul Aussaresses, Services speciaux: Alg6rie 1955-195 Z74
The General recounts in detail that he tortured Algerians as part of
France's military policy in Algeria. The book sports a prominent band
with an unofficial subtitle added by the publisher: "My Testimony on
Torture" ("Mon timoignage sur la torture"). A dual scandal has raged in
France since its publication. On the one hand, the book recounts in
detail what the general French media reports to have been known for
decades, but had not been documented so irrefutably before. On the
other hand, the author is not revealing his own conduct in order to
8 5
indict France; on the contrary, he is completely unrepentant.
Official response has been ambiguous. President Chirac immediately withdrew General Aussaresses's Ldgion d'honneur. Whether that
act signified repudiation of the torture, or rather, of the telling about
the torture, is an issue of interpretation. A recent editorial in Paris
Match put it this way: "What are we indignant about? About the confession of the old General Aussaresses about torture in Algeria. Or
about the public exhibition of those crimes. Is it the torture that re86
pels or its revelation that scandalizes?"
On the one hand, President Chirac's office issued a statement
that he was "'horrified by General Aussaresses' declarations and condemns the atrocities, torture and summary executions and murders
that may have been carried out during the war in Algeria.' "8s7 On the
other hand, Chirac
rejected calls for a formal apology over France's use of torture during the Algerian war of independence.
In a television interview, Mr Chirac said he would do nothing to
detract from the honour of those French soldiers who'd fought in
the conflict.
84

PAUL AUSSARESSES, SERVICES SPECIAUX: ALGERIE 1955-1957 (2001).
85 See id. Aussaresses has declared his endorsement of torture verbally in numerous interviews and public appearances since the publication of his book, a number of

which I have seen on the television channel that France exports, "TV-5." See also Brigitte Vital-Durand, Le Proces du gn&ral Aussaresses: Un tortionnairejuge pour ses mots,
LIB RATION, Nov. 26, 2001, at 16.
86 Alain Genestar, Torture, lafin de la quarantaine,PARis MATCH, May 17, 2001, at
45 ("De quoi s'indigne-t-on? Des aveux du vieux g~n~ral Aussaresses sur la torture en
Alg6rie. Ou de l'exhibition publique de ces crimes. Est-ce la torture qui r~vulse ou sa

rvlation qui scandalise?").
87 Chirac Condemns Torture General, BBC NEWS, May 4, 2001, at http://news.bbc.
co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/131255 6 .stm (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (quoting a press
release issued by French President Chirac's office).
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He said it was important not to reopen old wounds and he urged
88
both countries to continue along the path of reconciliation.
Predictably, part of the French public is clamoring to try General
Aussaresses for crimes against humanity.8 9 As with Papon, it is the
only serious crime which would not be dismissed, because all others
would violate a statute of limitations. 90 Judicial Diplomacy reported
Pierre Mairat, an attorney for the Movement Against Racism and for
Friendship Among Peoples (le Mouvement contre le racisme et pour
l'amitig entre les peuples ["MRAP"]), as saying that there should be
'judgement of Aussaresses for crimes against humanity."9' 1
The MRAP accordingly filed a lawsuit for crimes against humanity
against Aussaresses on May 9, 2001.92 While human rights groups so
far have not succeeded in having Aussaresses prosecuted either for
crimes against humanity or for war crimes, the British Broadcasting
Corp. correctly reported that "the mood in France is increasingly one
of atonement for atrocities committed in the former colony, and the
[Aussaresses] book.., has struck a very raw nerve." 9 3 On the other
hand, although the suits based on a theory of crimes against humanity
that have been resolved so far have resulted in dismissal, 94 the issue
still is pending. The MRAP suit was dismissed in July of 2001, but the
MRAP appealed. 95 Judgment was rendered against the MRAP by the
appellate court in December, 2001,96 but the MRAP has appealed that
88 Algeria: Chirac Rejects "Torture Apology", BBC NEWS, Dec. 15, 2000, at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1071504.stm (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
89 See Genestar, supra note 86 ("La notion de crime contre l'humanit6 est A ma-

nier avec precaution. L'envie, immhdiate, est dejuger le g4nhral Aussaresses pour ses
crimes.").
90 The courts did find another criminal violation, and Aussaresses has undergone
the first proceeding. See infra notes 115-24 and accompanying text.
91 Arnaud Grellier, General Aussaresses Sentenced, DIPLOMATIE JUDICIAIRE, Jan. 25,
2002, at http://www.diplomatiejudiciaire.com/UK/Aussaresses4.html (last visited
Apr. 3, 2003). Agence France-Pressereports that the prosecution did not even open an
investigation when the LDH filed a complaint against Aussaresses for crimes against
humanity. See Aussaresses: Pas de poursuites pour "crimes contre l'humanitl, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 14, 2001.
92 See Paul Aussaresses, General de brigade de l'arme franfqise: Le gknral Paul Aussaresses a ete reconnu coupable d'apologie de ses crimes commis pendant la guene d'Algrie,
DIPLOMATIE JUDICIAIRE, Jan. 25, 2002, at http://www.diplomatiejudiciaire.com/Aussaresses.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Paul Aussaresses].
93 Hugh Schofield, French General Charged over Algeria, BBC NEWS, June 15, 2001,
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1391234.stm
(last visited Apr. 3,

2003).
94 See Grellier, supra note 91.
95 Paul Aussaresses, supra note 92.
96 Id.
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decision to the Cour de cassation.9 7 Moreover, two other suits were
filed by civil parties, asserting crimes against humanity-one by a victim of torture in Algeria, and the other by two sisters of an Algerian
FLN leader allegedly murdered in the presence of Aussaresses. 98 As
of January 18, 2002, the suit of the sisters was dismissed. 99
The move to prosecute Aussaresses for war crimes also failed because to date even war crimes are subject to a statute of limitations in
France. Although France has signed the European Convention ofJanuary 25, 1974, on the imprescriptibility of war crimes, 10 0 France's Parliament has not ratified the Convention. 10 1 In addition to the
European Convention, the United Nations Convention of November
26, 1968, also makes war crimes imprescriptible. I0 2 However, the
French law of 1964 that took crimes against humanity outside the
scope of limitations periods "clearly limited imprescriptibility solely to
crimes against humanity, to the exclusion of war crimes.

' 10 3

Indeed,

Professor Roujou de Boube notes that, unlike prior law, the 1964 text
no longer explicitly linked imprescriptibility to the nature of the
crime. 10 4 While he concludes that this does not mean that there is no
97 Id. As far as I have been able to ascertain, the case is pending as of this writing.
98 Id.
99 See Philippe Bernard, Guerre d'Algfrie: L impossible anniversaire,LE MONDE, Jan.
24, 2002, at 18 (indicating that an appeal of the dismissal was likely).
100 European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, opened for signature Jan. 24, 1974,
Europ. T.S., No. 82, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 540.
101 Roujou DE BoUBEE ET AL., supra note 45, at 108 n.7; Eric Conan, Aussaresses:
Plaintes en souffrance, L'ExPREss, May 24, 2001, at 22. On the distinction between
crimes against humanity and war crimes, see Levasseur, supra note 32, at 260, 271.
102 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity, Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73.
103 Boudarel, supra note 37, at 284 (citing Jacques Francillon, Jurisclasseur P6nal
Annexes, Fasc. 410, no. 140, and sources cited therein). In section 3 of part III.A., the
source continues:
La loi du 26 d&cembre 1964, en constatant limprescriptibilite des crimes contre
l'humanit, "tels qu'ils sont definis par la rsolution des Nations Unies du 13fvrier
1946, prenant acte de la ddfinition des crimes contre l'humanit, telle qu'elle figure
dans la Charte du Tribunal inernational [sic] du 8 aofit 1945', a clairement
restreint limprescriptibilitgaux seuls crimes contre l'humanit ti l'exclusion des crimes
de guerre.
Id. To translate,
The law of December 26, 1964, in declaring the imprescriptibility of crimes
against humanity "as they are defined by the U.N. Resolution of February 13,
1946, defining crimes against humanity as they figure in the Charter of the
International Tribunal of August 8, 1945," clearly restricted imprescriptibility solely to crimes against humanity, to the exclusion of war crimes.
104 See Roujou DE BOUBEE ET AL., supra note 45, at 128.
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connection left between imprescriptibility and the nature of the offense, 10 5 severance of a necessary linkage between the nature of crime
10 6
and imprescriptibility has emerged.
In Boudarel,10 7 another French war crimes case in which the plaintiffs asserted crimes against humanity, and one that followed on the
heels of the Touvier case, a legal commentator of the Touvier decision
of November 27, 1992, noted that the court had "formally distinguished the Vichy regime from the Rome-Berlin Axis powers; namely,
Germany and Italy (to which it perhaps is apposite to add their European allies, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania)."' ' "' In Boudarel,the Cour de
cassation interpreted Touvier not only as categorically limiting crimes
against humanity under French law to acts committed by or for a European Axis power, but also, and more specifically, as excluding acts
committed in the far east.1 0 9
The Boudarel case was to reach France's highest court, but it involved alleged crimes against humanity committed during France's
conflict in Vietnam. Boudarel was a Frenchman who had deserted the
French army in Vietnam, proceeding to join the Communist VietMinh, and to torture French prisoners of war, participating and often
directing their systematic starvation and political brainwashing.' 1 0
The rapporteur of the Cour de cassationopinion in Boudarelconcluded
that the Touvier decision of 1992 had limited "the field of application
of the Nuremberg Charter to the Axis powers and their accomplices."'
The Dalloz edition of the French Criminal Code mirrors
the case law in excluding acts committed in Vietnam as outside the
scope of the crime against humanity:
The provisions of the law of December 26, 1964, and of the statute
of the Nuremberg International Tribunal, appended to the London
Charter of August 8, 1945, involved only acts committed on behalf
of European Axis powers; moreover, the Charter of the Tokyo International Military Tribunal, neither ratified nor published in France,
and which did not figure in the intended scope ["qui n'est pas entrie
105 Id.
106 This result may not be attributable to the text of the law, however, because
judicial interpretation has been crucial in defining the modern French crime against
humanity.
107 Boudarel, supra note 37.
108 Id. at 284 ("Ainsi le rgime de Vichy a t4 distinguformellementdes puissances de l'Axe
Rome-Berlin, c'est-d-dire l'Allemagne et l'Italie (auxquelles il convient peut-gtre d'ajouter leurs
allids europeens, Hongrie, Bulgarie, Roumanie).").
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id. (" Le champ d'applicationde la charte de Nuremberg a 9t limitg aux puissances de
l'Axe, et d leurs complices.").
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dans les prvisions"] of the law of December 26, 1964 or of the United
Nations' resolution of February 13, 1946, addresses, in its Art. 5,

only abuses committed by Japanese war criminals or their accomplices; thus, the persecutions and inhuman treatments inflicted on
prisoners of the Vit-Minh, after the Second World War, by a
French national, are not amenable to being considered as crimes
against humanity and necessarily come within the scope of Article
30 of the law of June 18, 1966, granting amnesty with respect to all
crimes linked to the events arising from the Vietnamese
insurrection.' 12
The Boudarel case suggests that the French judiciary will not try
Aussaresses for crimes against humanity because only crimes against
humanity committed in the course of the Second World War, and excluding the Orient, can come within the scope of imprescriptibility.11 3 Moreover, in the excerpt quoted above, the Boudarel court
further held that, even if the nature of the crimes committed by
Boudarel did qualify as crimes against humanity, they were not cognizable because all acts arising out of the Vietnam conflict had been
amnestied pursuant to Article 30 of the law of June 18, 1966.114
This last reason also would seem determinative for Aussaresses
inasmuch as a similar amnesty law was passed with respect to all acts
committed during the Algerian conflict.1 1 5 Indeed, in two previous
decisions, Yacoubl 16 and Lakdar-Tourni,117 the Cour de cassation already
had ruled that the Algerian amnesty barred a lawsuit in which the
plaintiff had alleged crimes against humanity in connection with that
conflict.
In the closely knit relation of law to politics, France's courts have
sought to appease the most recent public outcry, arising from the Aussaresses situation, by hauling General Aussaresses and his publisher
into court, not for crimes against humanity, but for a little used code
violation falling under legal infractions by the press ("dglit de
presse"). 1 a8 The author and his publisher were charged with and con112

C. PEN. DALLOZ, supra note 37, at 150.
113 See Boudarel, supra note 37, at 289-90.
114 Id. at 290; see also supra text accompanying note 112.
115 See Ordonnance No. 62-248 of Aug. 14, 1962; Loi No. 68-697 of July 31, 1968,
discussed in Boudarel, supra note 37, at 288-89.
116 On Yacoub, see Cass. crim., Nov. 29, 1988, appeal no. 87-80/566, Dalloz 1991,
discussed in Boudarel, supra note 37, at 288-89.
117 On Lakdar-Tourni,see Dalloz 1991, Chron. at 231, text of decision appended to
Mme Poncela, L'humanit, une victime peu prisentable, cited in Roujou DE BOUBtE ET AL.,
supra note 45, at 129 n.1.
118 See C. PN. DALLOZ, supra note 37, art. 23 (L. no. 72-546 du lerjuill. 1972), at
1679.
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victed of "complicity for apologizing for war crimes" by the tribunal
correctionnel de Paris.199 Among the civil parties were the MRAP, the
League of Human Rights (1a Ligue des droits de l'homme ["LDH"]) and
the Association of Christians for the Abolition of Torture (l'Association
des chr6tiens pour l'abolition de la torture ["ACAT"] ).120 Each of the civil12 1
party plaintiffs was awarded one euro in damages.
The judge expressed indignation about Aussaresses's endorsement of torture and murder, but the three-day court proceedings did
not address national responsibility or guilt or the relation of Aussaresses' conduct to national policy. The focus, rather, was on
whether the book "incited readers to reach a favorable moral judgment" about the matters Aussaresses recounted. 122 The court noted
in particular that the general's lack of remorse was not constitutive of
the criminal code violation at issue. Rather, his commentary at the
beginning of his book was a "statement of principle [that] valorized in
advance the acts set forth in the rest of the book" and "removed from
the eyes of the reader the moral turpitude inherent in actions con-' 123
demned without reserve by the international community.'
This may serve the expiatory function of the trial in the manner
the scholar Ren6 Girard believes to be the primary function of trials:
the institutionalization of a cathartic channeling for popular emotions
that otherwise would threaten a polity's stability. 124 A French publisher summarized the case against Aussaresses, and more particularly
the fact that his publisher received a stiffer penalty than Aussaresses,
119

See id. art. 24 (L. no. 92-1336 du 16 dc. 1992), at 1684. This is a "dWlit de

presse," a violation of the press. See id. art. 23, at 1679.
120 See Paul Aussaresses, supra note 92.
121 See Franck Johann~s, Le genralAussaresses a 86 condamng a 7 500 euros d'amende
pour "apologie de crimes de guerre", LE MONDE, Jan. 27-28, 2002, at 6. Note that the

award of one euro is the legal idea that used to be known as "le franc symbolique," a
judicial award aiming to convey moral vindication.
122 FranckJohanns, 100 000francs d'amende requis contre le gbnralAussaresses etses
6diteurs, LE MONDE, Nov. 30, 2001, at 14.
123 Both quotes appear in French in Marie-Estelle Pech, Le gh~nmral Aussaresses condamne d 7 500 euros d'amende, LE FIGARO, Jan. 26, 2002, at 8. (As of this writing, I have
not been able to get the court opinion of January 25, 2002.) See also Marie-Estelle
Pech, Le g6nralAussaresses de retour devant les tribunaux, LE FiCARO, Feb. 21, 2003, at 9

(reporting that Aussaresses's sentence was upheld before an appeals court in Paris).
124 See RENt. GIRARD, LA VIOLENCE ET LE SACRI passim (1972); see also James Q.
Whitman, Jheringparmi les Franfais, 1870-1918, in LA SCIENCE JURIDIQUE FRAN(.AISE ET
LA SCIENCE JURIDIQUE ALLEMANDE DE 1870 A 1918, at 151, 156 (Olivier Beaud & Patrick
Wachsmann eds., Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg 1997) (discussing Professor

Whitman's rendition of Jhering's view that "the modern court's task is to produce a
fight, to imitate ancient vengeance").
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as signifying that the crime itself was less important than its
125
publication.
The judicial setting was devoid of legal and political consequences for the French government or, indeed, for anyone but the
publishers and an individual defendant reviled by every side, whether
because he had "spilled the beans" on France's murderous practices
in Algeria, or, for the other side, because he personally and unrepentantly had committed torture and murder. The judiciary oversaw a discussion of France's practices in Algeria so confined by the
delimitations of the criminal charge that had been brought, that no
argument connected to crimes against humanity was legally cognizable within it. The tribunal correctionnel de Paris decided that Aussaresses's infraction lay in the book's justifying the methods used in
Algeria, and that one does not have the right to say everything in the
name of freedom of expression. 126 France's role in Algeria and towards Algerians was not an issue; only its metatext was an issuenamely, Aussaresses's commentary on it, and the publisher's publication of it.
Politicizing and distorting the crime against humanity has not
been the sole province of the courts. While on the one hand the
courts continually have redefined the crime against humanity for the
reasons discussed above; on the other hand, parties do the same for
reasons of a different motivation. Plaintiffs urge redefinition so as to
allow their claims to be heard, to be judicially cognizable ("recevables"). They allege crimes against humanity where the plaintiffs otherwise would be barred from asserting any claims. Similarly, for their
own purposes, defendants cast the issues in legal contexts likely to displace the original focus. General Aussaresses's lawyer, for example,

125 See Olivier Le Naire, Qui veut bdillonner l'edition?, L'ExPRESs, Apr. 11, 2002, at
46. The noted French feminist attorney and author, Gisle Halimi, is reported as
having said that the 7500 euro fine the court imposed on Aussaresses was so minimal
a penalty as to make his conviction "futile." See Emilie Grangeray, Gis&le Halimi ou le
choix des mots, LE MONDE, Mar. 1, 2002, at X. Indeed, the penalty of the publishers
Perrin, a subsidiary of Perrin and Plon, was 15,000 euros each, twice the amount Aussaresses was ordered to pay, raising questions of freedom of expression. See, e.g., Alain
Salles, Le livre et lajustice,LE MONDE, Mar. 5, 2002, at 17.
126 I am translating almost word for word from a November 29, 2001, French TV-5
broadcast of a program on which I took notes. For the French view on the limitations
appropriate to freedom of expression, see ALICE KAPLAN, THE COLLABORATOR: THE
TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF ROBERT BRASILLACH 227-29 (2000); PHILIP WATTS, ALLEGORIES OF THE PURGE: How LITERATURE RESPONDED TO THE POSTWAR TRIALS OF WRITERS
AND INTELLECTUALS IN FRANCE (1998).
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defines the trial of his client simply as an issue of state censorship of
expression. 127
French legal scholars today appear to have no qualms in assessing
the function of legal proceedings as including an important component of political strategy. Professor Maistre du Chambon's recent
commentary on statutes of limitations in French law goes so far as to
refer to "social appeasement" as a recognized purpose of statutes of
limitation.1 28 His commentary underscores also the powerful, however much unintended, potential of procedure to affect substantive
law. Professor Maistre du Chambon explains that a primary basis for
statutes of limitation in public law proceedings is to punish
prosecutorial inertia ("la volontg de sanctionnerlinertie du Parquet").129
However one assesses the value of such a goal in and of itself, when
contextualized, it necessarily places criminals beyond prosecution and
130
crimes beyond justice where the state has been guilty of inertia.
The social appeasement factor in the Aussaresses prosecution appears to have fallen short of fulfillment. The latest and no doubt least
expected consequence of the Aussaresses debacle has been the filing
of a complaint on August 30, 2001 against France for crimes against
humanity, not by the Algerians whom France's military tortured, but
by the opposite camp: the Harkis, a pro-French Algerian group, allied
with France during the war in Algeria, claiming to have been tortured
by the nationalist FLN Algerians after France pulled out of Algeria
pursuant to the Evian accords in 1962. They are suing France in a
Paris court, the tribunal de grande instance de Paris, on the argument
that, when France pulled out of Algeria, it became complicit in the
ensuing massacre of Harkis because it knew or should have known
that the FLN Algerian nationalists would massacre the Harkis. 13 1 It is
estimated that between 30,000 and 150,000 of them were
32
murdered.1
127 His lawyer was quoted as saying that this was "the first censorship of the history
of France that men lived ... in pain and in honor." Fabien Novial, Le g nral Aussaresses condamng pour ses confessions sur la torture, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan. 25, 2002.
Nor is this by any means a specious contention. The defendant publishers, Perrin
and Plon, make a similar, still stronger case for this position.
128 Patrick Maistre du Chambon, L'hostilit de la Cour de cassation u l',gard de la
prescription de l'action publique,J.C.P. 2002, II, 10075, at 934 (May 22, 2002).

129 Id. at 931.
130 It should be noted in this context (as indeed Professor Maistre du Chambon
does note) that the French judicial response to statutes of limitations in criminal matters has been one of hostility. See id.
131 See Laurent Chabrun et al., La plainte des harkis est-ellejustifie?, L'ExPREss, Aug.
30, 2001, at 12.
132 See id.; see also Les harkis, in CGiAM-ps LYtsEs 2-4 (2001).
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Under a strict jurisprudential analysis, the Harki claim should fail
due to the amnesty of Algerian conflict crimes; the inapplicability of
the imprescriptibility criminal code provision to war crimes; and, finally, the fact that the allegations themselves do not accuse the
French of the act of murder. 133 Rather, the complaint alleges that
crimes against humanity are legally attributableto France even though
France's enemies, the FLN Algerians, committed them, not
Frenchmen and not persons acting under orders from, or on behalf
of, France.
On the other hand, the public outcry to expand the crime against
humanity beyond acts of the Second World War is considerable. In
the Boudarel case, the Cour de cassation left the door open to this possibility by suggesting that amnesty laws may not apply to crimes that
qualify in substantive nature as crimes against humanity.1 34 In May of
2000, however, the court confirmed Yacoub, 135 ruling in a new case
that crimes against humanity arising out of the Algerian conflict could
not constitute the basis of legally cognizable claims because they were
136
governed by the law of July 31, 1968, amnestying those events.
The plaintiffs in the May 2000 case had asserted civil-party status
claims for crimes against humanity alleged to have been committed
against pro-Algerian demonstrators in Paris on October 17, 1961.137

The plaintiffs had argued that a national law granting amnesty cannot
supersede a criminal violation of international law.1 38 The academic
commentator to the court opinion, as published in La Semaine
juridique, noted critically of the Cour de cassation decision that French
law contravened international law to the extent that a French perpetrator of a crime against humanity benefited from amnesty under
139
French law.
On the other hand, another scholarly evaluation of the French
crime against humanity is that legislative intent, long before judicial
133 See CHAMPS-ILYSEtS, supra note 132; Chabrun et al., supra note 131.
134 See Boudarel, supra note 37, at 289-90; Jacques-Henri Robert, Note 38: Amnistie.-Crimes contre l'humanitg-Prescription,Lois PtNALES ANNEXES, J.-CL. PtNAL ANNEXES 9 (1994).
135 See supra note 116.
136 Cass. crim., May 30, 2000, reprinted in 27 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE 1328 (July 4,
2001); accord Lakdar-Tourni, Cass. crim., Nov. 29, 1998, cited in Roujou DE BOUBEE ET
AL., supra note 45, at 129 n.l.
137 This was the massacre of Algerians conducted under the auspices of Papon in

reaction to a demonstration by Algerians in Paris on that date. See supra note 83 and
accompanying text.
138 See Jean-Franiois Roulot, Note: Un Etat peut-il amnistier des actes constitutifs de
crimes internationaux, in 27 LA SEMAINEJURIDIQUE 1329 (July 4, 2001).

139

Id. at 1330.
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interpretation, made it a matter of French internal law, independent
of international law. 140 Under this reasoning, national amnesty both
does and should preclude prosecution of crimes against humanity.
Among those who espouse this reasoning are some who concede that
it has the potential to trivialize the crime against humanity as it exists
1 41
in its international legal context.
The Semaine juridique legal commentator deflected attention
from the domain of law by noting that France's acts in Algeria were
part of a "burning national debate that the judges clearly have not
wanted to enter."1 42 Reflecting, among other things, the traditional
civil-law system's privileging of the legislature over the judiciary, the
commentator concluded that "if there is to be a debate, it should not
be decided by judges alone, however eminent they may be, but before
elected assemblies."'

14 3

In fact, there has been at least one attempt to shift the locus of
action to an "elected assembly." On January 22, 2002, France's National Assembly approved a bill to make March 19, the date of the
Algerian cease-fire, a yearly date of national remembrance for the victims of Algeria, but the government announced that the bill would
not be submitted to the Senate. 14 4 Moreover, close to five hundred
indignant generals signed a manifesto to "rehabilitate the action of
the [French] army in Algeria in the face of generalized defamation."'1 4 5 They are among what appears to be a small minority in
France today that believes France's war in Algeria had legitimate and
just goals, and refuses to yield the entire terrain of victimhood to Arab
Algerians, just as, some forty years ago, Albert Camus steadfastly refused to yield that terrain to Jean-Paul Sartre.
CONCLUSION

The legacy of Nazism was to spawn in its immediate aftermath, as
a reaction to it, the concept of crimes designed to prevent future Nazisms, such as the crime of genocide, and the crime against humanity.

The stronger legacy of Nazism has been something different: the
140 Rou.JOU DE BOUBfE ET AL., supra note 45, at 108-09.
141 See id.
142 Roulot, supra note 138, at 1330 (" [U]n debat national brilant dans lequel les juges
n'ont manifestement pas voulu entrer.").

143 Id. (" [Sli debat ily a, ce dernier ne doit pas tre tranchl par les seuls juges, aussi
eminents soient-ils, mais devant les assemblees glues.").
144 Jean-Dominique Merchet, Guerre d'Algbrie: 500 ggntfraux montent en ligne, LIBERATION, Jan. 23, 2002, at 14.
145 See id. (quotation translated from the original French).
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politicization of law. Nazism did not cause this, but its occurrence
enables us to recognize it more easily.
From the acts of Nazi collaborators to those of Algerian torturers,
the crime against humanity has been handled by the courts of France
with every attention to the political message and political consequences of the adjudications. In France today, the question of
whether an accused person committed an act that substantively meets
the definition of a crime against humanity has become virtually irrelevant except under the extremely limited set of circumstances discussed above.
The French courts' limitations and distortions of the crime
against humanity have a sort of technical, legalistic basis inasmuch as
the Nuremberg Charter refers to crimes arising from the Second
14 6
World War, and the French national law is based on that charter.
On the other hand, the text of France's criminal code provision
evokes a crime of a substantive nature, defined explicitly in terms of
acts and motivations not circumscribed by any particular setting or
event, and indeed with every apparent applicability to any act that otherwise meets the definition of the contemplated act and motive. No
limitation to any specific military conflict or geographical location exists in the French code provision. Moreover, as even Professor Roujou
de Boub~e has emphasized, despite his approval of a French internal
legal definition of the crime, France's crime against humanity pur147
ports to reflect universal values inspired by natural law.
The Harki suit underscores another aspect of the contemporary
politico-legal context for crimes against humanity. France's actions in
Algeria are under scrutiny for crimes committed as part of France's
colonialist history. In the clamor for recognition that France committed crimes against humanity, violating national and international humanitarian and legal standards, there is no space allotted to crimes
committed by any but the French. France is portrayed as the criminal
perpetrator even, as in the Harki case, where the plaintiffs themselves
allege that Algerians committed the criminal acts.
The chaotic uproar over France's conduct does not extend to an
uproar over Algeria's acts, to similar demands for recognition that Algerians, in the name of Algeria, committed crimes against humanity.
Thus, on one level, national courts have eviscerated a national crime
against humanity through judicial processes. On another level, the
146

Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 82

U.N.T.S. 284, reprinted in 2 SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL

147

AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL

LAw 61 (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald et al. eds., 2000).

See RoujoU

DE BOUBEE ET AL.,

supra note 45, at 103.
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politics of application so far have immunized another nation and its
individual perpetrators from judicial pursuit or moral opprobrium, as
the anti-colonialist discourse has refused to cede space for victimhood
to any but victims of colonialism.
French historian Henry Rousso has put it as follows:
The face of the hero little by little is fading away in favor of that of
the victim, and the confrontation of former adversaries no longer
concerns the question of knowing to what extent each side led a war
of just aims-albeit with methods and consequences that rarely
were [just]-but, rather, [the issue has become] their ability to pre1 48
sent themselves as victims.

Ultimately, the perpetrators' acts themselves, which one might
have supposed and hoped to be the dominant legal issue, have become a small and generally insufficient attribute of legal cognizance
in France today. Moreover, even the selection of defendants does not
depend solely on the actual identity of the actors, but also on political
and social ideology. When one thinks of the faith Raphael Lemkin
placed in law, perhaps one should be glad that he died shortly after
what he still was able to experience as a moment of triumph, presaging, as he saw it, a future of definitive justice under law. 149
The crime against humanity has not changed in nature, nor has it
changed in textual definition, but its judicial application is at the
mercy of the politics of those who interpret it. The French example
offers a view of judicial mechanisms that affect powerful substantive
changes in law "under the cover of interpreting the law."' 50
148 Henry Rousso, La guerre dAlghrie et la culture de la mmoire, LE MONDE, Apr. 5,
2002, at 17. For an abstract and philosophical discussion relevant to this issue, see
BADIOU,

supra note 1, at 13 ("In his capacity as tormentor, man is an animal abjection,

but we need to have the courage to say that, as a victim, in general he isn't any

better.").
149 See Professor Glendon's tribute to "the men and women [who were engaged
in promoting the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948]

who, after two world wars which gave them every reason to despair about the human
condition, did what they could to help make the world a better and safer place."
Glendon, supra note 31, at 1155. As Glendon also stated, "For them, the elusiveness
of the goal did not mean it was not worth pursuing with all one's might and main."

Id. at 1174.
150 I take this expression from the French treatise that so describes the practice of
the French judiciary to disguise its ulterior motives: "sous le couvert de linterprtationde
la loi." JACQUEs GHESTIN & GILLEs GoUBEAUX, TRArrI DE DROIT CIVIL.: INTRODUCTION
GPNtRALE

318 (1977). For a portrayal of the common-law mechanisms of unobtrusive

change in judicially created law, see
REASONING 6-19 (1949).
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The obstacles to assessing the contemporaneous status of underlying legal principles and values are steep at any time. They are likely
to grow steeper in coming years, however, and to become one of the
inevitable costs of globalization. Society is the context for law and for
law's meaning, and, as our world unifies ever more, and as rival perspectives and understandings diminish and disappear, "a certain type
of discourse dominates the public debates to the point of preventing
the multitude from hearing any point of view which would not share
the assumptions and the formal structure of that dominant discourse."15 1 If those assumptions themselves become incompatible
with fundamental principles of human rights, legal concepts such as
the crime against humanity will not be adjudicated to serve humanity,
and eventually even may justify crimes against humanity by masking
and mischaracterizing them.
As Byron Kaldis points out, "peace and justice ... wrongly [are]
supposed to be somehow pursued independently of the kind of actors
responsible for bringing [them] about. That is, such an end is
wrongly expected to be accomplished with the help of the existing
12
actors, themselves remaining unaltered ....
A paradox of our time is that law's degeneration in Nazi- and
Stalin-dominated countries in the first half of the twentieth century
has spawned at the dawn of the twenty-first century a bewildering faith
in law, rather than an abiding concern about its potential for rank
politicization and consequent legitimation and perpetration of
153
injustice.
151 Yves Citton, Circularism and the Tyranny of Demand (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). See BADIou, supra note 1, at 76 ("Each time one absolutizes the power of a truth, one organizes an evil."). On our society's decreasing
tolerance for conflicting perspectives of the good, see George P. Fletcher, The Casefor
Tolerance, 13 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 229-34 (1996).
152 Byron Kaldis, World Justice, Global Politics and Nation States: Three Ethico-Political
Problems, 7 EUR. LEGACY 167, 171-72 (2002).

153 In a recent interview with Robert Badinter, former Minister of Justice, about
the International Criminal Tribunal, the Express news magazine asked Badinter when
he thought the international court would materialize, putting it as follows: "when will
utopia become reality?" ("Quand l'utopie deviendra-t-elle r~alite?"). The question was

understood and answered without comment as to its dubious assumption. Diane Galliot & Vincent Hugueux, "Interdirel'impunite": Les chantiers de la CourpEnale internationale vus par Robert Badinter, L'ExPREss, July 4, 2002, at 19. The United States has a
long tradition of reluctance to be bound by universal laws. Ren6 Cassin described
U.S. refusal of the League of Nations's distinction between wars of aggression and
defense as emanating from the "Anglo-Saxon mentality" that refuses rigidity. CASSIN,
supra note 7, at 22. Then, as now, the United States expressed its position as based on
the danger that nations might manipulate the written law so as to wage wars of aggression disguised as wars of defense. See id. What Cassin described as an Anglo-Saxon
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Raphael Lemkin understood the truth of Nazi jurisprudence, but
he forgot its most profound truth. The political philosopher Ernst
Cassirer understood it better. In 1946, in The Myth of the State, Cassirer
wrote that legal concepts and legal texts "have no real binding force, if
they are not the expression of [what] is written in the citizens' minds.
Without this moral support the very strength of a state becomes its
inherent danger." 1 54 His words apply also to supranational and international legal orders, and we would do well to heed them today.

mentality may have its roots in the deeply entrenched skepticism in common-law legal
culture towards the law qua text, what Professor Farnsworth has called the common
law "mistrust" of legislation. See E. Allan Farnsworth, A Common Lawyer's View of His
Civilian Colleagues, 57 LA. L. REV. 227, 233 (1996). One might also think in this context of Karl Popper's reminder that "it is we who must distinguish between the true
prophets and the false prophets." 1 K.R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITs ENEMIES:
THE SPELL OF PLATO 66 (5th ed. rev. 1966).
154 ERNST CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE 76 (1946); see also POPPER, supra note
153, at 115 ("[T]he strength of the laws does not lie in the sanctions, in the protective
power of the state which enforces them, but in the individual's readiness to obey
them, i.e. in the individual's moral will."); Glendon, supra note 31, at 1176. Glendon
observed,
The flaws in the human rights enterprise are less in its documentary
landmarks than in the human person-with all our potential for good and
evil, reason and impulse, trust and betrayal, creativity and destruction, selfishness, and cooperation. [T]he framers [of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights] staked their faith, in Article 1, on "reason and conscience."
But they were under no illusions about the precariousness of that wager.
Glendon, supra note 31, at 1176.

